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ABSTRACT  
   
In this discussion I will state fundamental principles of Kelsen's Legal 
Positivism in International Law and explain four problems with his theory. I will 
then propose two suggestions in the light of which Kelsen's theory is modified in 
this discussion and explain how these two suggestions address the four problems 
and help the theory account for regime change. Finally, I will address possible 
objections to the view advanced in this discussion. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Legal Positivism is the view that whether a given norm is legally valid depends on 
its sources, not its merits. In Kelsen’s Legal Positivism, the sources of legal 
validity are higher legal norms. For Kelsen, law is a self-contained normative, 
hierarchical system, in which the validity of every norm depends on a higher 
norm. Ultimately, the validity of a legal order depends on the highest norm, 
namely the Grundnorm. Since the validity of a legal order depends on this highest 
norm, the Grundnorm is not only the highest norm in the hierarchy of the legal 
order, but also its fundamental norm. Therefore, the absence of the Grundnorm 
deprives the entire legal order of validity. In other words, the Grundnorm of a 
legal order makes the legal order valid. 
 
Regime change is the substitution of one legal order by another. As stated above, 
according to Kelsen, the Grundnorm is the foundation and the reason of validity 
of the legal order and is its highest norm. Therefore, the Grundnorm is sine qua 
non for a valid legal order to exist. Therefore, since regime change means the 
substitution of one legal order by another, in the case of regime change, the 
Grundnorm of the previous legal order somehow disappears and respectively the 
Grundnorm of the new legal order appears. Therefore, the premise that a valid 
legal order is necessarily based on the Grundnorm implies that there is no regime 
change without a change of Grundnorm. (This is so according to Kelsen’s theory, 
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but the modifications of Kelsen’s theory in this discussion will change this 
premise regarding the Grundnorm of the international legal order, as I will explain 
below). But how can one Grundnorm be replaced by another? Kelsen holds that 
the international legal order is superior to national legal orders. A new legal order 
derives its validity from its recognition as a valid legal order by international law. 
The international law makes this judgment based on the principle of effectiveness. 
Thus, if a national legal order is, by and large, effective, then it is valid according 
to international law.  
 
If so, then four questions arise. First, how can Kelsen’s Legal Positivism 
account for international regime change? Like any legal order, the international 
legal order is based on a Grundnorm, which I will call the international 
Grundnorm. As explained above, substitution of one legal order by another, i.e. 
regime change, necessarily entails the substitution of the Grundnorm of the 
previous legal order by the Grundnorm of the next legal order. At the level of the 
national legal orders, the substitution of the previous Grundnorm by the next one 
is explained by recognition of the new Grundnorm and the new legal order by the 
international legal order which is superior. If no legal order is superior to the 
international legal order, how can Kelsen’s Legal Positivism account for 
international regime change?  
Second, how does Kelsen’s theory account for change in custom? In other 
words, how does Kelsen’s theory recognize the validity of a change in custom? 
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Custom has to do with how states have behaved in the past. Specifically, custom 
is state practice, i.e. actual consistent practice of states, and ‘opinio juris’, i.e. the 
acceptance by states of that practice as law. Kelsen maintains that the content of 
the Grundnorm of the international legal order is ‘states ought to behave as they 
customarily behaved’. This essentially means that states have to behave as they 
behaved in the past, so states cannot behave differently opposite to previous 
practice, i.e. opposite to already existing custom, so states in effect cannot change 
custom.  If the content of the international Grundnorm is ‘states ought to behave 
as they customarily behaved’, then how is Kelsen’s theory able to account for the 
validity of a change in custom?  
Third, the premise of supremacy of international law over national law is 
inconsistent with a national government having the power to reject international 
law, which is also implied by Kelsen’s view. Kelsen maintains that in 
international law, law can arise from injustice (ex injuria jus oritur). This is 
extremely important as most readers of international law are used to learning the 
opposite principle as a principle of international law, namely that ‘law does not 
arise from injustice’ (ex injuria jus non oritur), or, in other words, that illegal acts 
cannot create law. This principle, ‘law does not arise from injustice’, entails e.g. 
that an illegal invasion of a state by another state does not give the invading state 
any legal rights to the land it occupied. However, Kelsen disagrees. He maintains 
that this principle is not valid in international law, and thus he holds that in 
international law, law does arise from injustice (ex injuria jus oritur). He also 
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maintains that an effective legal order is a valid legal order (principle of 
effectiveness). Therefore, in our previous example, if a state illegally invades 
another state and the invading state, with pure power, effectively establishes its 
own legal order, or effectively expands its legal order to the land it now occupies, 
then the legal order of the invading state in the recently occupied land is valid. 
The invading state occupied the land and effectively established a legal order not 
by exercising a legal right, but with illegal use of force, with pure power. Thus, it 
seems to follow that ‘whoever has the power makes law’. But if that is the case, 
then how can the international legal order be superior to national legal orders, 
when a national government might have sufficient power to reject international 
law? Some explanations and exemplifications of this problem are the following. 
How can international law be supreme, if a national government can invade 
another state contrary to international law and therefore affect international law? 
How can international law be supreme, if it is at least possible that a clause of the 
constitution of a domestic legal order is applied by the courts, expected to apply 
by the people of that legal order and generally accepted as a valid legal rule by 
that legal order, even though it is in direct opposition to international law (let us 
say to a clause of an international treaty to which the state in question is party)? 
Fourth, how can externally imposed regime change ever be legal? If 
Kelsen’s account for regime change is committed to the principle that ‘might 
makes right’, then it seems that external regime change, namely regime change 
performed after conquest or invasion by other states or international 
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organizations, is always and everywhere permitted as long as an agent has the 
power to change the regime. However, this is in conflict with positive law, and in 
particular with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Kelsen’s view, being a Legal 
Positivist view, cannot ignore positive law, especially this fundamental legal 
clause of a very important international treaty, namely the UN Charter. Indeed, 
international lawyers and other self-consistent positivists, maintain that in 
international law, sovereign states have an absolute right against the external use 
of force to effectuate regime change under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. If that 
is the case, how can externally imposed regime change be legal?   
 
In this thesis I will argue that two suggestions proposed by the New Haven School 
can address these four problems. The two suggestions are the following. Firstly, 
the Grundnorm of international law is the principle of world public order based on 
human dignity. Secondly, international law can be regarded as including not only 
custom and international treaties, but also stable patterns of expectations of 
politically relevant actors which are grounded in a belief in someone’s authority 
and the threat of coercion. I believe that these two suggestions can address the 
four questions. 
 
Firstly, how can Kelsen’s Legal Positivism account for international regime 
change? According to the first suggestion, the Grundnorm of international law is 
‘Actors of international law ought to act in a way so as to facilitate a world public 
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order based on human dignity’. The international Grundnorm does not change, it 
just is. What can change is the interpretation of the international Grundnorm, but 
not the international Grundnorm as such. Thus, if international regime change 
takes place, what will have happened in reference to the Grundnorm is not that the 
international Grundnorm will have changed, but the interpretation of the 
international Grundnorm will have changed. Since the international Grundnorm 
cannot change and it remains ‘idle’, there is no need for a superior legal order that 
will account for a change of the international Grundnorm. The fact that the 
international Grundnorm does not change is not a problem when accounting for 
regime change. On the contrary, the different interpretations of the unchangeable 
international Grundnorm can account for international regime change. This 
obviously departs from the necessary implication of Kelsen’s theory mentioned 
above, namely that ‘no regime change without change of Grundnorm’ and this 
will be addressed below. The non-changeability of the international Grundnorm is 
a necessary commitment of the international order being the supreme international 
legal order. 
 
Secondly, how can Kelsen’s theory account for the change in custom? In other 
words, how can Kelsen’s theory explain how and why one customary rule can be 
validly replaced by another? Since, according to the first suggestion, the 
international Grundnorm does not maintain that states ought to behave the way 
they customarily behaved, a valid change of custom can be accounted as follows. 
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Custom can validly change because the international actors change opinions and 
attitudes as to what world public order based on human dignity is. As already 
mentioned, the international Grundnorm does not change, it remains ‘idle’, but the 
interpretation of it can change. 
 
Thirdly, how can the international legal order be superior to national legal orders, 
when a national government might have sufficient power to reject international 
law? Here, the second suggestion relating to the sources of international law is 
useful. Kelsen follows the traditional approach as regards the sources of 
international law: international law is treaties and custom. According to my 
proposal, in the light of the New Haven School, international law is not only 
treaties and custom, but also expectations of politically relevant actors which are 
grounded in a belief in someone’s authority and the threat of coercion. When a 
national government rejects international law, Kelsen’s traditional sources of 
international law fail to maintain the supremacy of international law over national 
legal orders, because a national legal order disobeys international law. But by 
adding stable patterns of expectations of politically relevant actors to the list of 
sources of international law, the judge of international law will be able to 
maintain the supremacy of international law in such cases. Judges will do so by 
looking for new evidence in expectations of politically relevant actors. If, for 
example, these expectations have the content that, despite a contrary norm or 
clause of international law, a clause of the US Constitution is valid, then this is 
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reflected in international law. The expectations of politically relevant actors that 
this constitutional clause is valid, is evidence that international law allows this 
clause to be valid. Therefore, with this broader list of sources of international law, 
the judge can maintain the superiority of international legal order over national 
legal orders. 
 
Fourthly, how can externally imposed regime change ever be legal? The first 
suggestion of my proposal is to change the content of the international 
Grundnorm from ‘states behaving as they customarily behaved’ to world public 
order based on human dignity. Human dignity is no longer merely an issue 
international law ought to address, but it must be regarded as the very purpose of 
the international legal order. It is in the light of this purpose that Article 2 (4) of 
the UN Charter is to be interpreted. This clause does grant a right to states, but 
this right is not absolute. Therefore, states do have a right against external use of 
force to effectuate regime change based on Article 2 (4), but if the target state is 
obviously operating against a world order based on human dignity, thus clearly 
against the very purpose of the international legal order, then the purpose of the 
international legal order is a justification that can override Article 2 (4) and grant 
other states and/or international organizations the right to intervene in order to 
perform the kind of regime change that will bring about a national legal order 
based on human dignity. According to this interpretation, might does not make 
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right. It is rather the Grundnorm that makes externally imposed regime change 
right, merely in some cases. 
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Chapter 2 
HANS KELSEN'S LEGAL POSITIVISM - THE GRUNDNORM 
In order to make the explanation of how Kelsen accounts for regime change 
clearly understood, I will first explain the hierarchy of law in Kelsen’s Legal 
Positivism. According to Kelsen, the legal validity of a law, and the legality of an 
act prohibited or allowed by such law, depends on the validity of the source of 
that law according to a higher law. Thus, law is hierarchical. What determines the 
legal validity of a law and legality of an act depends on the validity of that law 
according to a higher law. Kelsen answers the question of validity with what can 
be called a ‘bottom-up’ approach. That is to say, he starts from the lowest norms 
and asks the source of their validity and so on and so forth. To the question why 
an act of coercion, e.g. imprisonment of an individual, is a legal act, the answer is: 
because imprisonment has been prescribed by an individual norm, namely a 
judicial decision. To the question why this individual norm is valid as part of a 
definite legal order, the answer is: because it has been created in conformity with 
a criminal statute. The act of coercion and the statute can be called lower norms. 
Finally, this statute receives its validity from the constitution, since it has been 
established by the competent organ according to the process the constitution 
prescribes. The constitutional norms that describe how law is made are called 
higher norms. If we ask why the constitution is valid, perhaps we come upon an 
older constitution. Ultimately we reach some constitution that is historically the 
first and that was laid down by an individual usurper or by some kind of 
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assembly. The validity of this first constitution is the last presupposition, the final 
postulate, upon which the validity of all the norms of the legal order depends. 
This is the Grundnorm and it states that one ought to behave as the individual or 
the individuals who have laid down the first constitution have ordained.  
 
In Kelsen’s Legal Positivism, higher norms derive their validity from the 
Grundnorm. Therefore, the Grundnorm is the foundation of a legal order. Without 
this basic norm, there is no valid legal order. The Grundnorm itself is not a norm 
of positive law1, so it is meta-legal. It is a norm which we presuppose when we 
interpret social relations in legal terms, when we speak of rights, duties, 
jurisdictions, etc. It is a hypothesis of juristic thinking, the fundamental condition 
under which our juristic propositions are possible. We may or may not accept this 
hypothesis because we may or may not interpret human relations as legal 
relations. We may consider them as cause and effect. However, if we consider 
them as legal relations, i.e. if we consider them as regulated by a legal order, then 
we presuppose that the historically first constitution, on which this legal order is 
established, is a binding norm, that people ought to behave in conformity with 
that constitution. The Grundnorm is a necessary condition, or a precondition, of 
any legal order. The Grundnorm is not a procedural norm. It is not itself a 
procedure. It does not explain how law is made. The Grundnorm is a value norm 
which poses a procedure for deciding what law is. The procedure for deciding 
                                                          
1
 Kelsen, Hans. 1952. Principles of International Law. New York; Rinehart & Company Inc. p. 
411. 
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what is law are the higher norms mentioned in the previous paragraph. These 
higher norms are in the constitution, and presuppose the Grundnorm. The 
Grundnorm is a value norm and could at best be phrased as ‘We ought to obey the 
constitution’. Higher norms are procedural and dictate how the law is made. The 
Grundnorm itself is not procedural and it is a content-neutral norm. It is content-
neutral because the Grundnorm itself does not tell us what the law is. The higher 
procedural norms, whose validity is derived from the Grundnorm, are the norms 
that will tell us what the substantive law is.  
 
It is often stated that the constitution is the foundation of a legal order. This is 
true, in the sense that the constitution is the highest law of a legal order. 
Therefore, any law that is contrary to the constitution is not legally valid. 
However, it is wrong to assume that the constitution itself is the Grundnorm. The 
constitution is indeed the ‘backbone’ of a legal order and the legal order depends 
on its constitution, but the constitution itself is a law. For example, constitutional 
clauses that grant specific individual rights to people are themselves substantive 
law. (Therefore, it is correct to say that we have ‘constitutional rights’, i.e. 
substantive legal rights that are granted directly from constitutional clauses, 
regardless of laws, lower in the hierarchy, which may elaborate on the scope of 
these rights.) However, as stated in the previous paragraph, the Grundnorm itself 
is not a law. It is a meta-legal norm. Therefore, the constitution itself cannot be 
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the Grundnorm. The Grundnorm is a meta-legal norm that is a precondition of 
validity of the constitution.  
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Chapter 3 
KELSEN'S ACCOUNT ON REGIME CHANGE 
By regime change I mean the substitution of one legal order by another. Regime 
change can be brought about in several ways, either internal or external (or both). 
Internal regime changes are usually revolutions and coup d’états. External regime 
changes are interventions from international organizations, as in the case of the 
NATO intervention at Kosovo, or from other countries as in the case of the 
US/UK attack and occupation of Iraq. The ways in which regime change is 
brought about will not be discussed here. I will focus on regime change per se and 
how Legal Positivism can be modified in order to account for regime change. 
Every legal order is necessarily based on a Grundnorm. Therefore, all domestic 
legal orders have their own Grundnorm. With national regime change, i.e. with 
the substitution of one national legal order with another, the Grundnorm of the 
previous national legal order is replaced by the Grundnorm of the next national 
legal order. How does this happen? 
 
Kelsen is a monist, which means he believes that the international legal order is a 
part of a universal order which also comprises all the national legal orders. The 
international legal order is superior to the national legal orders and it determines 
the validity of the national legal orders. Therefore, the international law is 
superior to national law. It is for this reason that if a legal order, even if through 
its constitution, violates international law, then this national order breaches 
15 
 
international law and is liable in international law. Since the international legal 
order is a legal order, it necessarily has its own Grundnorm. Since the 
international legal order is a superior legal order, the Grundnorm of the 
international legal order is superior to the Grundnorm of the national legal orders. 
The Grundnorm of the international legal order is superior because it is the 
precondition of a legal order that confers validity on all the other legal orders. 
Therefore, to avoid confusion, I will call the Grundnorm of the international legal 
order the international Grundnorm, and the Grundnorms of the national legal 
orders as sub-Grundnorms. National regime change means that one national legal 
order is substituted by another. Therefore, regime change is the substitution of one 
sub-Grundnorm by another. 
 
What is the content of the international Grundnorm? Kelsen follows the same 
‘bottom-up’ approach as in national legal order. He starts from the lowest norm 
within international law, namely the decision of an international tribunal. If we 
ask why the norm created by such a decision is valid, the answer is furnished by 
the treaty in accordance with which the tribunal was instituted. Then, if we ask 
why this treaty is valid, we are led back to the general norm which obligates the 
states to behave in conformity with the treaties they have concluded, a norm 
commonly expressed by the phrase pacta sunt servanda. This basic norm of 
international law is a customary norm. Therefore, the basic norm of international 
law is a norm which countenances custom as a norm-creating fact, and is 
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formulated as follows: the states ought to behave as they have customarily 
behaved. Customary international law, developed on the basis of this norm, is the 
first stage within the international legal order. The next stage is formed by the 
norms created by treaties. Therefore, according to Kelsen, the international 
Grundnorm is that the states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved.  
 
Interestingly, it can be argued that Kelsen contradicts himself here. One the hand, 
the international Grundnorm is a meta-legal norm, a presupposition, which seems 
to suggest that it exists regardless of any empirical facts, but on the other hand, 
Kelsen, in the aforementioned ‘bottom-up’ approach, refers to empirical facts in 
order to find the content of the international Grundnorm. My conjecture is that 
Kelsen’s reply here could be that the quest for empirical basis is not an 
ontological question, thus it is not about the existence of the international 
Grundnorm, but this empirical basis answers the epistemological question of how 
we come to find out what the exact content of the international Grundnorm is. In 
any case, this issue does not influence the view advanced in this discussion, 
because the view advanced here does not regard the international Grundnorm as 
being that the states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved. 
 
Having identified the international Grundnorm, I will now continue to explain 
how Kelsen accounts for regime change. Kelsen accounts for regime change 
based on the principle of effectiveness. This is a principle of positive international 
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law according to which people ought to behave in conformity with a coercive 
order which is effective. It is implied in the rule usually formulated in the 
statement that according to international law an effective and independent 
government is the legitimate government of the state. That means that, according 
to international law, an actually established authority is the legitimate 
government, the coercive order enacted by this government is the legal order, a 
valid legal order, and the community constituted by this order is a state in the 
sense of international law, insofar as this order is, by and large, effective.  
 
Parenthetically I would like to address here why the principle of effectiveness 
should not, in my view, be the international Grundnorm. Since the principle of 
effectiveness identifies the legal order that people in a certain area should obey, it 
is admittedly a very attractive candidate for the international Grundnorm. 
However, if this is so, then international law cannot escape the ‘might makes 
right’ problem: if the principle of effectiveness itself is the international 
Grundnorm, then invading a state in order for the invading state to impose its own 
effective legal order in the invaded state would be not only in accordance with the 
legal order, but also encouraged by the very foundation of the international legal 
order.   
 
Kelsen’s account of regime change is in accordance with the hierarchy of law, 
which is a key feature of his theory. His monism and the primacy of the 
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international legal order over national legal orders dictates that the international 
legal order is superior to national legal orders. This is a foundation of the claim 
that national legal orders are recognized as such by international law based on the 
principle of effectiveness. Focusing on the details, the following should be 
noticed: the legality of an action depends on the legal order that is in place at the 
time the action is performed. Therefore, when legal order A is in place and A is 
then replaced by legal order B, by an illegal action, e.g. coup d’état, revolution, or 
invasion by another country, the legality of the action that brought about the 
substitution of the legal orders must be judged in accordance with the legal order 
that was in place when the action was performed, namely legal order A. 
According to legal order A, this action is illegal. Besides, no legal order provides 
for its own termination. No constitution has an ‘expiration date’. On the contrary, 
constitutions and the legal orders based on them are supposed to last forever. 
Admittedly, there have been voices arguing for the opposite. For example, 
Thomas Jefferson held that ‘the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time 
with the blood of patriots and tyrants’ and seemed to welcome revolution, at least 
for certain reasons, e.g. in order to preserve liberty. Notably, it can perhaps be 
argued that what Thomas Jefferson meant is that a permissible revolution is one 
that supports liberty, provided that the rulers ignore liberty. Thus, it could be 
argued that if the legal order is of the kind that Thomas Jefferson suggests, i.e. the 
kind of legal order that preserves liberty, then revolution is not permissible. It 
may be the case that Thomas Jefferson meant that revolution is permissible only 
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to preserve liberty, when rulers fail to do so. In any case, for the sake of the 
argument I will suppose that Thomas Jefferson simply meant that there should be 
revolution every generation or so. Even if that is so, it can be seen as a realistic 
observation or even a moral command when rulers abuse their power, but not a 
legal rule. Revolution is not provided by the legal system. Revolution that 
invalidates the constitution is not provided by the legal order. Revolution is a fact 
of empirical reality and if it prevails, then it can replace the previous legal order – 
the principle of effectiveness will allow international law to recognize the new 
legal order. However, this recognition comes from the international legal order, 
not from the (previous) national legal order which is substituted. Constitutions 
and legal orders are supposed to last forever, regardless if national legal orders are 
in fact replaced, e.g. by revolutions. The reasons that terminate national legal 
orders are not reasons provided by the legal order. These reasons are factual, 
empirical, in no way legal. The question that inevitably arises is how can a new 
valid legal order (here, legal order B) arise from a violation of law? According to 
Kelsen’s hierarchical theory, the answer could only be because a higher law 
allows it. This higher law is the international legal order which is superior to the 
national legal orders. A new legal order, namely legal order B, is established 
because it is regarded as a legal order by the higher legal order, namely the 
international legal order. A new sub-Grundnorm is established, namely the sub-
Grundnorm of legal order B, as it is recognized by the higher international legal 
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order which is based on the international Grundnorm, which is superior to any 
sub-Grundnorm. However, there are number of problems with Kelsen’s account.  
 
In the introduction, I briefly stated the problems with Kelsen’s account and stated 
two solutions that can address these problems. Having referred to Kelsen’s Legal 
Positivism and explained how Kelsen accounts regime change, I will now explain 
the problems with Kelsen’s account in more detail, present the solutions fully and 
explain more analytically how the solutions can address the four problems with 
Kelsen’s account. 
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Chapter 4 
PROBLEMS WITH KELSEN'S ACCOUNT 
4.1. First problem: how can international regime change be accounted for? 
 
The first problem relates to the international Grundnorm. At the national level, a 
new legal order can replace a previous one, and respectively the new Grundnorm 
of this new legal order can replace the previous Grundnorm of the previous legal 
order, because the international legal order, which is superior to national legal 
orders, recognizes the new Grundnorm and the new legal order. The sub-
Grundnorms can change because the international legal order, based on the 
international Grundnorm, can justify the change. If it is true that: 
a) the international legal order is superior to national legal orders, and  
b) there is no legal order superior to the international legal order, 
then one has to conclude that the international legal order is the supreme legal 
order. Respectively, since the international Grundnorm is the source of the 
international legal order, i.e. the reason for its validity, then the international 
Grundnorm is the ultimate norm. The change of sub-Grundnorms is justified by 
superior norms. Since the international Grundnorm is the supreme norm, then 
there is no norm that is hierarchically superior to it. So there is no norm according 
to which it could change. So the international Grundnorm can never change. 
Although this may not pose direct problems when thinking practically of 
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international law as accounting for the changing of national legal orders, I believe 
this issue poses a theoretical-philosophical problem. 
 
The problem is that Kelsen’s account of regime change seems to necessarily entail 
that an international regime change is conceptually impossible. For the sake of the 
argument, let us suppose that an international regime change does take place. Just 
like in a national regime change, whether the causes are internal or external is 
irrelevant. An international regime change could be brought about internally, 
namely by states, or externally, e.g. imposed by space aliens. The point is that 
there is no law or norm superior to the international Grundnorm that can justify its 
change. Therefore, if an international regime change does take place, Kelsen’s 
theory will be unable to account for it, unable to justify it.  
 
4.2. Second problem: how can Kelsen’s theory account for change in custom? 
 
As already mentioned, according to Kelsen, the content of the international 
Grundnorm is that the states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved. 
This content of the international Grundnorm makes the theory unable to account 
for the validity of a change in custom. 
  
If the norm is that states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved and 
this norm cannot change, then it seems that states may not start behaving 
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differently from custom and states may not create opposite custom. This seems 
wrong. Let us suppose that it is a customary international rule that the exclusive 
economic zone of a state is two hundred nautical miles from its coast. Let us 
suppose that a significant number of coastal states have acted in accordance with 
this rule for purely practical reasons, e.g. because it was thought that all the 
marine sources of interest were within this zone. Let us suppose that with 
advancement of technology, states discover marine sources of interest beyond the 
two hundred nautical miles, up to three hundred miles. In cases where this causes 
no conflict, states change their behavior and start behaving in accordance to a new 
rule, according to which the exclusive economic zone extends up to three hundred 
nautical miles from the coast, in so far as this causes no overlap of exclusive 
economic zones, in the case of which states can only extend their exclusive 
economic zone only up to two hundred nautical miles. This is a simple and 
rational change of behavior of states and a change of state behavior that, other 
things being equal, everyone would accept as permissible. However, this is 
impermissible if the international Grundnorm is that states ought to behave as 
they have customarily behaved. 
 
4.3. Third problem: how can the international legal order be superior to national 
legal orders, when a national government might have sufficient power to reject 
international law? 
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This problem relates to ex injuria jus oritur (‘law arises from injustice’). Kelsen 
justifies regime change by clearly stating that ‘Under general international law 
(i.e. customary law), the states are obliged to respect the territorial integrity of the 
other states; but a violation of this obligation does not exclude the change of the 
legal situation. The principle advocated by some writers – ex injuria jus non 
oritur (‘a right cannot originate in an illegal act’) – does not, or not without 
important exceptions, apply in international law.’ Thus, according to Kelsen, 
when it comes to regime change, law can arise from injustice. If we add to this the 
principle of effectiveness according to which any effective legal order is a valid 
legal order, which Kelsen also accepts2, it seems to follow that whoever has 
effective power, makes the valid law. Respect for territorial integrity of states is a 
customary rule, but based on the above two premises, one has to conclude that in 
case of an invasion and regime change, there are two outcomes: a) if the invading 
state fails to establish an effective legal order, the invading state is liable in 
international law for having violated the territorial integrity of the attacked state, 
and b) if the invading state is successful and imposes its own legal order in the 
territory that was previously a state, the invading state’s legal order will be valid 
because it is effective. Therefore, the norm that seems to be observed here is that 
‘whoever has the power makes law’.  
 
                                                          
2
 Kelsen, Hans. 1952. Principles of International Law. New York; Rinehart & Company Inc. pp. 
412-414. 
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If that is accurate, then monism must be rejected, because it is perfectly possible 
that a lower law will usurp a higher law through the exercise of power by the 
proponent of the lower law. The following example can illustrate this. Let us 
suppose that a constitutional clause of the US Constitution is in violation with 
international law. According to monism, international law is superior and 
therefore the US is liable to international law. Let us suppose that the US 
government ignores international law and insists in not amending the constitution 
in accordance with international law. Let us suppose that the American people 
expect the Constitution and not international law to solve their disputes and 
problems and the entire legal order of the US follows the Constitution instead of 
international law. Let us suppose that many other states follow the same trend 
with the same constitutional clause that is in violation of international law. In this 
example, a lower law, namely a constitutional clause, has usurped a higher law, 
namely the relevant international law that is being violated, through the exercise 
of power by the proponent of the lower law, namely the US. It seems that the 
foundation of the legal order is not that states ought to behave but that might 
makes right, as law is whatever power dictates. Besides, since ex injuria jus 
oritur, an illegal action or a norm contrary to valid legal norms becomes legal if 
enforced.  
 
4.4. Fourth problem: no norm permitting external regime change 
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If Kelsen’s account for regime change ends up being committed to the principle 
that might makes right, then it seems that external regime change is always and 
everywhere permitted as long as the agent performing the regime change has the 
power to do so. However, this is in contrast with positive law, and in particular 
with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Kelsen’s view, as a Legal Positivist view, 
cannot ignore positive law, especially this fundamental legal clause of a very 
important international treaty, namely the UN Charter. Indeed, international 
lawyers and other self-consistent positivists, maintain that in international law, 
sovereign states have an absolute right against the external use of force to 
effectuate regime change under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. If that is the case, 
how can externally imposed regime change ever be legal?  What is the higher 
legal norm that allows it?  
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Chapter 5 
SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
Two modifications are suggested here that will change Kelsen’s Legal Positivism 
significantly. However, this is not a substitution of Legal Positivism with an 
entirely different theory. I endorse Legal Positivism in the international realm, as 
well as Kelsen’s monism. I agree with the primacy of international law over the 
national legal orders and believe that this indeed explains regime change: a new 
national legal order is valid because the higher international law counts it as valid. 
States do not make international law, but international law makes states. 
However, two important amendments of Kelsen’s view are suggested as solutions 
to the four problems I have identified:  
 
a) First, I propose that we understand the Grundnorm of international law to 
be the principle of world public order based on human dignity3. Public 
order means effective, peaceful and law-governed society. A society based 
on human dignity is one that is egalitarian, democratic and guarantees 
certain fundamental human rights.  
 
b) My second proposal is that we expand the sources of international law. 
Kelsen’s view of the sources of international law is the traditional view: 
                                                          
3
 McDougal, Myres, Lasswell, Harold, Reisman, Michael. 1967. The world constitutive process of 
authoritative decision. Journal of Legal Education 19 (253); pp. 403 – 437, p. 416. Also: Chen, 
Lung-chu. 1993. Perspectives from the New Haven School. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
(American Society of International Law) 87; pp. 407-411, p. 409 Stable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25658754 accessed: 13/02/2012 15:56.  
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international law is international custom and international treaties. In this 
discussion, I am adding another set of rules that comprise international 
law, namely stable patterns of expectation of politically relevant actors 
that are grounded in a belief in someone’s authority and the threat of 
coercion, along the lines suggested by the New Haven School. Although I 
endorse Legal Positivism in the international realm, the international legal 
order has one qualitative difference from the national legal orders: it is 
decentralized, or in any case, not as centralized as the national legal 
orders. Therefore, it is possible that a lower law will usurp a higher law 
through the exercise of power by the proponent of the lower law as 
illustrated in the example above with the US Constitution violating 
international law. Evidence of positive law in the international law most 
certainly includes custom and international treaties. It is now suggested 
that evidence of positive law also includes stable patterns of expectation of 
politically relevant actors that are grounded in a belief in someone’s 
authority and the threat of coercion. This expansion of what counts as 
evidence of positive law in international law will consequently allow the 
international legal order to retain its superiority against national legal 
orders with no conceptual problems. 
 
Before I move on to the solutions to the problems, I will explain the relation 
between the international Grundnorm, the constitution of international law, and 
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the particular international laws, e.g., stable patterns of expectations that 
constitute rules of law. International Grundnorm is the meta-legal norm which is 
the reason of validity of the ‘constitution’ of the international legal order and the 
international legal order in general. The stable patterns of expectations are a 
source of international law, like custom, treaties and general principles of law. 
There is no other direct connection between them, which is why they are two 
separate suggestions. 
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Chapter 6 
SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS 
6.1. The first problem: how to account for international regime change 
 
According to the first suggestion, the Grundnorm of international law is not that 
‘States ought to behave the way they customarily behaved’ as Kelsen suggests, 
but in the light of the New Haven School, the international Grundnorm is ‘Actors 
of international law ought to act in a way so as to facilitate a world public order 
based on human dignity’. There is one qualitative difference between the 
international Grundnorm and the sub-Grundnorms. The latter Grundnorms can 
change, if the international legal order recognizes a new sub-Grundnorm in the 
place of a previous one, whereas the international Grundnorm cannot change 
because there is no legal order superior to the international legal order, no 
superior norm than the international Grundnorm that can justify a change of the 
international Grundnorm. The international Grundnorm does not change.  
 
However, although the international Grundnorm as such cannot change, the 
interpretation of the international Grundnorm can change and that is exactly what 
can account for international regime change4. Thus, if international regime change 
takes place, what will have happened in reference to the Grundnorm is not that the 
international Grundnorm will have changed, but the interpretation of the 
                                                          
4
 As stated in paragraph 2 in the Introduction (page 1), this is a departure from the Kelsen’s 
premise that regime change always necessarily entails change of Grundnorm. 
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international Grundnorm will have changed. The non-changeability of the 
international Grundnorm is a necessary commitment of the international order 
being the supreme international legal order. Different interpretations of the 
unchangeable international Grundnorm can account for international regime 
change. Indeed it could be hard to distinguish, on first glance, the difference 
between international regime change and international regime modification, but 
this will be addressed later on at the objections section. 
 
Conceptions of world public order and especially human dignity change from 
time to time. Therefore, the international Grundnorm can account for international 
regime change. If states perform a regime change in international law – if, for 
example, the UN and the UN Charter cease to exist or are replaced by another 
international organization with a different charter as the League of Nations was 
replaced by the UN - then the international Grundnorm will remain the same. 
States will be acting in what they think is the best way to bring about a world 
public order based on human dignity.  
 
Notably, if the international Grundnorm is, as Kelsen suggests, ‘states ought to 
behave as they customarily behaved’, then there is no room for interpretation. In 
such a case, the only way for a new international regime to be established is for 
the international Grundnorm to be substituted by another one. However, this is 
impossible since there is no superior Grundnorm than the international 
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Grundnorm, and there is no superior legal order than the international legal order, 
so there is no higher norm or legal order to recognize a new international 
Grundnorm.  
 
Therefore, it seems that the first suggestion, namely the international Grundnorm 
being ‘states ought to act in such a way so to bring about a world public order 
based on human dignity’, addresses the problem of international regime change, a 
problem which cannot be solved by the international Grundnorm as stated by 
Kelsen. 
 
6.2. The second problem: how to account for change in custom 
 
We can also account for how changes in custom can be legally valid if we regard 
the Grundnorm of international law along the lines that I propose. Custom is a 
higher norm in international law, because it creates law. What custom is, i.e. what 
consistent state practice is, changes from time to time. Since the new international 
Grundnorm no longer maintains that states ought to behave the way they 
customarily behaved, the change of custom can be accounted for as follows. 
Custom changes because the international actors change opinions and attitudes as 
to what world public order based on human dignity is. This is an empirical claim 
and it can be supported by a few examples. In ancient times, enslaving the 
population of a territory that had lost a war and was occupied was not regarded as 
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a behavior contrary to human dignity. In the Hellenic world, it was well 
established that a victorious state had complete discretion over how to treat the 
soldiers and civilians of its vanquished enemy5. Xenophon states that ‘there is an 
eternal law among all mankind, that whenever a city is taken in warfare, both the 
people and their possessions belong to those who captured the city,’6 and Aristotle 
notes that ‘the law is an agreement by which they say that the things conquered in 
war are the property of the conquerors.’7 It is safe to say that these opinions and 
attitudes are no longer supported. Genocide and slavery, under any circumstances, 
are now regarded as behaviors that are contrary to human dignity. The 
international Grundnorm proposed in this discussion justifies the changes in 
custom provided that the changes are warranted by defensible interpretations of 
the international Grundnorm. 
 
6.3. The problem of ex injuria jus oritur and primacy of international law 
 
I will now turn to the problem of how international law could be supreme if it is 
true that wrongdoing can create (legal) justice. According to my proposal, another 
set of rules that comprise international law, apart from treaties and custom, is 
stable pattern of expectations about the behavior of politically relevant actors that 
is grounded in a belief in someone’s authority and the threat of coercion. Thus, in 
                                                          
5
 Lanni, Adriaan. 2008. The laws of war in ancient Greece III Specific norms, Treatment of 
captives. Law and History Review 26(3);  http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/lhr/26.3/lanni.html 
accessed at April 10th 2012. 
6
 Xenophon Cyropaedia 7.5.73 in ibid. 
7
 Aristotle Politics, bk. 1, chap. 6, lines 6–7, 1255a6–8; see also Polybius 5.11 in ibid. 
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the example mentioned of the US constitutional clause violating international law, 
it seems possible to address the issue with, the new class of evidence of 
international law upholding the primacy of international law over national legal 
orders, which is necessary to account for regime change. The judge has now more 
evidence to use to determine what the law is. Apart from treaties and custom, the 
judge is authorized to search for stable patterns of expectations. Therefore, if it is 
obvious that in the US legal order there is a clear expectation that the US 
Constitution will prevail over international law and everyone expects it to do so, 
then international law reflects that, in order to retain its superiority. International 
law is seen as acknowledging the constitutional clause in question. According to 
Kelsen, the sources of international law are custom and treaties. Thus, the judge 
cannot use the expectations about the behavior of politically relevant actors as 
evidence for law and the judge can regard as international law only the norm of 
international law that in the example is being violated. Since the US keeps 
ignoring and violating international law by following their national constitution 
which violates international law, international law seems to be unable to receive 
obedience from national legal orders and thus international law seems inferior 
rather than superior to national legal orders. With my proposal, the judge can 
maintain the superiority of international law, because the norm of international 
law that is violated will be changed in the light of new evidence of international 
law, so international law will no longer be violated by the US constitution. 
International law will be changed in the light of new evidence of international 
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law, that being expectations about the behavior of politically relevant actors. The 
mere fact that international law might seem to change in the light of national law 
does not necessarily entail that international law is not superior to national law. 
Similarly, if in a domestic legal order a constitutional clause changes in the light 
of specific laws, the constitution is not regarded as inferior than the laws in the 
light of which the constitutional clause was amended. The supremacy of the 
constitution over the other laws – and the same can be argued here for 
international law in respect to national law – does not consist of what changes in 
the light of what. That said I will refer to primacy of international law over 
national law further on, when dealing with objection 7.3. 
 
A sensible objection could be raised here. According to Kelsen, the legal order is 
a normative8 self-contained order. Laws (specific laws, e.g. statutes) are norms 
because they prescribe or permit a certain human behavior. Law (legal order), is a 
normative order because it is a set of norms (laws) organized in a unit that we call 
normative order. Legal norms are issued by legal authorities and applied by the 
judges. According to Kelsen, judges only apply this specific kind of norms, i.e. 
legal norms. This is both a normative claim, i.e. it refers to how things should be, 
and a descriptive claim, i.e. it refers how things are. Therefore, Kelsen’s Legal 
Positivism does not allow jurists to resort to non-legal norms when adjudicating a 
case and this makes a legal order a self-contained order. Judges can apply only 
positive law. However, expectations seem to be a psychological phenomenon. 
                                                          
8
 Kelsen, Hans. 1952. Principles of International Law. New York; Rinehart & Company Inc. p. 6. 
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Thus, identifying stable patterns of expectations seems to be a matter of 
psychological research rather than of legal reasoning; application of such 
psychological patterns in law seems to be application of psychological 
expectations, not application of legal norms. Therefore, this is in opposition with 
Kelsen’s Legal Positivism, according to which law is a self-contained order and 
judges apply only legal norms. 
 
Although I find this objection reasonable, it can be answered. Indeed, Kelsen 
believes that juristic science is a separate science, different from other sciences 
like psychology or sociology. When a judge is deciding a case, he is 
making/applying juristic science. A legal order is a self-contained order, and a 
jurist does not reach outside this order just like a psychologist does not reach for 
norms outside psychology. When deciding a case, a judge does not apply 
sociological, psychological or moral norms, but legal norms. Therefore, law being 
a self-contained order has to do with what rules the judge initially applies. 
However, this does not mean that the content of a norm that is applied cannot be 
non-legal. Custom is a good example. Kelsen agrees that the sources of 
international law are custom and treaties. Custom itself is consistent state 
behavior, which is itself not a legal norm. It is a law-creating fact and thus can 
create law. State practice is also a kind of behavior, which is often empirical, not 
legal (although it can sometimes be legal, e.g. in the case of legislative behavior). 
However, the application of a customary rule is not exceeding the self-contained 
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international legal order. The process a judge engages in when trying to identify 
whether a proposed norm is a norm of customary international law, is rather 
empirical ranging from actions of states to political statements rather than purely 
legal. How does Kelsen still maintain that the international legal order is a self-
contained legal order? 
 
The answer is that custom is a source of law because positive law states so. 
Article 38 (1b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) states that 
the ICJ shall apply custom in the cases it decides. Judges engage in empirical 
research trying to identify whether a proposed norm is a norm of customary 
international law or not because positive law authorizes them to do so. In the 
international legal order, it is codified law that makes custom a source of law. In 
the contemporary international legal order in particular, according to Article 38 
(1) of the Statue of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the ICJ shall apply not 
only international conventions (point a) but also international custom (point b). 
Therefore, when the ICJ applies international custom in order to adjudicate a case, 
it is not using law as an empirical fact nor is it setting aside positive law in order 
to apply rules from empirical sciences. It is referring to custom in accordance with 
Article 38 (1) of the Statute, which is codified law. The judges are not free to set 
aside positive law and use any norms they like, e.g. ethical, social, or other norms. 
They are legally obligated to use only legal norms. Kelsen believes that a judge 
would be breaking the law if the judge set aside positive law and solved a case by 
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directly appealing to ethical norms without going through positive law9. Judges 
are legally obligated to use only legal norms. However, when legal norms 
authorize them to refer to non-legal norms or engage in empirical research, they 
are legally authorized and expected to do so, and this reasoning does not entail 
that the legal order is not a self-contained order. By engaging in empirical 
research, the judge of the ICJ is actually applying positive law, and in particular 
the Article 38 (1) of the aforementioned statute.  
 
Similarly, it can be argued that an ICJ judge can resort to stable patterns of 
expectations through the same article. Article 38 (1) of the Statue of the ICJ, 
which states what rules the ICJ shall apply, states, at point d, that ‘subject to the 
provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law’. Article 59 simply states that ‘The decision of the 
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that 
particular case.’ From Article (1d) it becomes obvious that apart from treaties, 
custom and general principles of law (1 a-c), the ICJ can even refer to teachings 
of publicists. Admittedly, the wording of the clause gives these teachings a 
                                                          
9
 One could raise the question in what sense a judge is legally obligated to use only legal norms. I 
can see many kinds of obligations, e.g. legal and moral obligations, but I cannot see more than one 
sense of legal obligations, and I think Kelsen would agree with this. Legal obligation is an 
obligation, or duty, imposed by law, i.e. positive law. It is what positive law commands. Kelsen 
makes it clear that the legal and moral orders are independent and that the jurist applies legal 
norms. See e.g. Kelsen, Hans. 1952. Principles of International Law. New York; Rinehart & 
Company Inc. p.  431 ‘like law and morality, as two different and mutually independent orders’, 
‘Just as the jurist ignores morality, …’. 
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secondary power compared to treaties and custom. Notably, the clause states that 
the teachings are ‘subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law’. 
Thus, the judge is to apply rules of law, not teachings. Teachings are the way with 
which the judge can identify these rules. Similarly, ICJ judges can use the stable 
patterns of expectations not as a source of international law like treaties and 
custom, but as a subsidiary means to determine what the law is. ‘What the law is’ 
could mean, depending on the case, either what the meaning is of a clause of an 
international treaty, or what the content is of an international customary norm. 
Thus, when judges are trying to determine what the law is, and they detect 
relevant stable patterns of expectations, they can use Article 38 (1d) in order to be 
justified in regarding these stable patterns of expectations as evidence of 
international law that they can apply to the case. 
 
In order for this argument to work, one would still have to subsume this in an 
interpretation of Article 38 (1d). First of all, if the judges are to look for stable 
patterns of expectations, one would inevitably have to ask whose expectations the 
judge is to refer to. The answer is the expectations of actors who are politically 
relevant, those who are in a position of relevant authority and can threaten 
coercion. In the example of the US Constitution, such authority, though perhaps 
not the only relevant one, would be the Supreme Court of the US (although they 
cannot really ‘threaten coercion’ since they have no police power).  
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The issue is now whether the people whose expectations the judges shall look for 
are the same people, that is, can be interpreted as being the same people, that 
Article 38 (1d) refers to. This clause refers to ‘qualified publicists’. It is not even 
necessary to resort to a fancy teleological interpretation in order to regard 
politically relevant people in authority that can threaten coercion as being 
‘qualified publicists’. A grammatical interpretation alone can yield this result. 
According to the Oxford dictionary10, the word ‘publicist’ has three meanings. 
From those three, the archaic meaning of the word is ‘a writer or other person 
skilled in international law’. Heads of states, delegations of states to other states 
or international organizations, judges of supreme courts of the national legal 
orders, etc. are presumably skilled in international law. Therefore, these ‘qualified 
publicists’ can be the same people whose expectations the judge shall look for in 
order to determine what the law is. It is hereby suggested that the teachings of 
qualified publicists can be read as referring to, perhaps among other things, 
expectations of politically relevant actors that are grounded in a belief in 
someone’s authority and the threat of coercion. In this discussion, I will not refer 
to what the ICJ has so far interpreted Article 38 1 (d) to mean. The argument is 
that, perhaps among other things, the term ‘teachings of qualified publicists’ 
could also be interpreted as meaning stable patterns of expectations of politically 
relevant actors. 
 
                                                          
10
 See Oxford University Press. Oxford Dictionaries 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/publicist?q=publicist  accessed at Mon April 9th 2012. 
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Therefore, just like when applying customary international law judges apply 
Article 38 1 (b), though they engage in empirical research to identify customary 
rules, similarly, in the cases when judges are to apply expectations for behavior of 
relevant actors as evidence of law according to my proposal, judges will apply 
Article 38 1 (d), though they will be engaging in a more or less research of a 
psychological reality. 
 
It is important to note that the definition of international law remains a positive 
law definition. Indeed, stable patterns of expectations reflect a psychological 
reality and the judge may have to engage in a psychological research in order to 
identify them. However, when applying stable patterns of expectations, the judge 
technically applies Article 38, so it is through positive law, i.e. by applying 
Article 38 which is positive law, that a judge can arrive at such norms. Therefore, 
since the expectations of politically relevant actors are reached by applying 
positive law, in particular Article 38 1 (d), formally the definition of law remains 
a positive law definition. 
 
6.4. The fourth problem: no norm permitting external regime change 
 
My proposal also addresses the fourth problem. My proposal is to change the 
content of the international Grundnorm from ‘states behaving as they customarily 
behaved’ to world public order based on human dignity. As stated above, public 
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order means effective, peaceful and law-governed society. A world order is based 
on human dignity when it is egalitarian, democratic and guarantees certain 
fundamental human rights. Two world wars and instances of genocide have 
shown that a traditional international law that focuses only on states and 
international organizations has failed to attain universal effectiveness. The former 
totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union created concerns regarding the 
significance of fundamental individual rights in the international realm. Even after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, totalitarian regimes still exist, e.g. North Korea, but 
there are also instances of genocide and gross violations of fundamental human 
rights. The importance of not only states and international organizations but also 
individuals in the international legal order has been increasing for decades. This 
means that there is an increasing expectation that individuals become subjects of 
certain rights granted directly from international law, without the intervention of 
national legal orders being required to grant these rights to individuals. These 
rights can function as a shield of protection of citizens against their own states. 
Individuals are not seen merely as subjects to their states alone. Certain rights 
granted to them by international law protect individuals from their own states and 
restrict the actions that states can perform on their own citizens. Human dignity 
can no longer be regarded as just another issue international law ought to address 
but must be regarded as the very purpose of the international legal order.  
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This claim is much easier to accept if one accepts that states exist in order to 
protect the individuals under their jurisdiction, in other words, protecting 
individuals justifies existence of states. Traditionally, the historical reason why 
citizens in Europe would pay taxes to the state is because that state, often 
represented by the King, would provide protection to the people of its jurisdiction. 
The ‘agreement’ was that people pay taxes in order to receive protection. 
Protection was usually thought of as repelling a foreign army from invading. 
Although this has also very often been the case, especially in central and west 
Europe, it has become obvious that civilians are often in danger by their own 
governments and not merely by foreign armies. If, from this historical fact, one 
accepts that what justifies the existence of states is that they protect their citizens, 
then there is no justification for states when they deliberately harm their citizens. 
Of course by the term harm here, I do not mean any kind of harm. States harm 
their citizens in ways that are regarded as entirely permissible, e.g. imprisonment 
and other criminal punishment imposed by the justice system, obligatory military 
service for some citizens (usually males) which obviously restricts their freedom 
during their service, taxation is an economic harm, etc. By the term harm I mean 
impermissible gross violations of fundamental rights, mainly genocide and 
torture. When governments, namely the organs of the executive function, harm – 
in the way harm was just defined- their citizens, then other state organs, especially 
the organs authorized to perform the judicial function, namely the courts, are 
expected to be a safeguard against the impermissible use of force and cause of 
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harm to citizens by the governments. However, for several reasons, this is not 
always the case. When these safeguards fail to restrict governments from 
committing genocide and torture against their own citizens, or, even worse, if 
these other state organs positively support these impermissible actions of 
governments against their own citizens, then in the absence of any functioning 
safeguards, it is the entire state itself that harms – as previously defined-  citizens. 
In such cases, one cannot expect from a state to protect the citizens of that state 
from the state itself, and since the international legal order is superior to the 
national legal orders, it does not seem absurd to hold that international law ought 
to protect individuals of a state from the state itself. Also, if the reason for the 
existence of states is the existence of a legal order that protects individuals, then 
by protecting the individuals, international law upholds such a legal order, and 
thus the states. 
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Chapter 7 
OBJECTIONS 
7.1. Vagueness of ‘human dignity’ 
 
A valid objection is that ‘human dignity’ is vague. This is a valid objection as it is 
hard to imagine an absolute infallible authority on what is human dignity. 
However, this could be addressed by the New Haven School. What human dignity 
is and what specific actions and forms of behavior are in accordance with or 
violate human dignity can change from time to time and this can account for 
change in custom, as noted above. Thus, what could be asked is what most actors 
of the international community regard as the content of human dignity at this 
time. Supporters of the New Haven School maintain, reasonably so, that human 
dignity consists of certain ‘bases’. These bases are minimum levels of goods that 
all people should have. If the international legal order guarantees that all humans 
have these minimum levels of some goods, then the international community 
successfully protects human dignity. One of these bases is a minimum level of 
physical and psychic well-being11. This base alone already makes the efficient 
prevention and termination of genocide and torture purposes of international law. 
Therefore, if prevention and termination of genocide and torture are the purpose 
of international law, then external regime change is justified, if the regime in 
power performs such atrocities. I am using the term ‘purpose’ in its ordinary 
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 McDougal, Myres, Lasswell, Harold, Reisman, Michael. 1967. The world constitutive process 
of authoritative decision. Journal of Legal Education 19 (253); pp. 403 – 437, p. 437. 
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sense: the reason why international law is necessary, apart from practical reasons, 
is to prevent gross violations of fundamental rights and especially to protect 
individuals against genocide and torture; the international legal order is seen as 
aiming at establishing a world public order based on human dignity. The new 
regime that is to be established is one which effectively prevents genocide and 
torture. Such a regime could be recognized as a state by the international legal 
order. Thus, in this reasoning, genocide and torture render the state that performs 
them illegitimate, so the international legal order which, as superior, grants states 
and their legal orders legitimacy can intervene to restore legitimacy and world 
public order based on human dignity, even if Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations does not authorize intervention.   
 
However, there is a contradiction that still needs to be resolved. On the one hand, 
human dignity is what at a specific time the international actors decide that it is 
(relativism), whereas on the other there are certain bases that are content of world 
public order based on human dignity. Indeed, the New Haven School regards 
these bases to be fixed. Admittedly, the relativist position undermines the 
plausibility of the international Gurndnorm which does not change, but given the 
commitments of this theory, the solution suggested for this contradiction would be 
the following. The theory maintains the relativist position, i.e. as mentioned 
above, human dignity is what at a specific time the international actors decide that 
it is. Thus, the bases are nothing more than what human dignity is at this time, or 
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in other words, what the international legal order regards, at this time, that human 
dignity is. Although the view in this discussion uses the bases from the New 
Haven School, unlike the New Haven School, the view in this discussion regards 
these bases as not fixed. 
 
7.2. Human dignity as the international Grundnorm 
 
Some objections can arise from the human dignity – rather say world public order 
based on human dignity – being the unchangeable Grundnorm. An objection 
could be stipulated as follows: when the interpretation of a norm changes, the 
norm changes as well. There is no such thing as a scientifically objective legal 
norm. Norms exist only in the minds of the persons bound by them or binding 
with them. Therefore, when those persons change their interpretation of the norm, 
the norm itself changes, whatever semantic continuities are involved. Therefore, 
the argument that the world public order based on human dignity is the 
international Grundnorm and it cannot change but its interpretation can change is 
false. 
 
One can only be very sympathetic to this objection. It is taken for granted that a 
different interpretation of a legal norm changes the exact content of the norm. 
Notably, the international Grundnorm is not a legal norm but a meta-legal norm, 
thus not the same in nature. However, this alone does not address the objection.  
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In the case of legal norms, there are many examples of legal norms that change 
content because of different interpretations. In the context of the US legal order, 
the cruel and unusual punishment could be used as an example. Though capital 
punishment was not regarded as cruel or unusual punishment in older times, there 
are nowadays voices arguing for the opposite. Actions that nowadays constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment might not have been regarded as constituting cruel 
and unusual punishment two centuries ago. Therefore, the content of this legal 
norm has changed. According to this objection, the change of content due to the 
interpretation is all that matters, and the rest is just empty words. This view leaves 
the semantics aside. 
 
This objection is very well taken, but the semantics are not disregarded in the 
view advanced in this discussion. In the cases of legal norms the interpretation of 
which changes through time, there is continuity in the norm expressed with the 
exact stipulation of the norm, i.e. with the exact words. This continuity can end 
with the use of the opposite norm. This is how a norm could come to an end. Let’s 
suppose the words with which a norm is stipulated is ‘A’. If a norm is brought 
about which is stipulated as ‘non-A’, then this would be the end of the norm ‘A’. 
If the example is ‘cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted’, then this 
norm could end with ‘cruel and unusual punishment shall be (/may be) inflicted’. 
Presumably, different interpretations of ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ in the 
norm ‘cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted’ will lead to different 
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results regarding whether certain punishments are cruel and unusual, but none of 
these interpretations will yield the result that ‘cruel and unusual punishment shall 
be, or may be, inflicted’. In the case of the norm that ‘ the international legal order 
should promote a world public order based on human dignity’, different 
interpretations of ‘human dignity’ will lead to different results regarding whether 
certain actions are in accordance with ‘human dignity’, but none of these 
interpretations will yield the result that ‘the international legal order should not 
promote a world public order based on human dignity’. 
  
According to the view presented in this discussion, human dignity has always 
been the international Grundnorm, and insofar as ancient international law was a 
defensible interpretation of it, it was valid. A typical premise of the argument that 
the ancient world did not have a notion of human dignity is the existence of 
slavery. Although slavery is nowadays obviously against human dignity, the 
existence of slavery in the ancient world does not necessarily mean that ancient 
legal orders did not have the concept of human dignity, because from a human 
dignity point of view, enslaving the vanquished enemies is better than 
slaughtering them and those were the only feasible choices. Interestingly, some 
evidence could be relevant here. I will leave aside rather isolated voices in the 
ancient Greek world that argue against slavery, e.g. Antiphon – ‘By nature we all 
equally possess with all respect the same origin, both Greeks and Barbarians’ – 
and the remarkable examples of consideration that slaves were given in ancient 
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Greek literature, e.g. in dialogues by Euripides in Helen. What is more important 
is that ancient Greek city states had laws protecting slaves from certain kinds of 
mistreatment, which seems to present a human dignity, though interpreted 
differently than today and having a much narrower scope. Interestingly: ‘Slaves in 
Attica, though holding few personal legal rights, were in part protected12 by 
Athenian law and society. The legal system in Attica investigated the death of 
slaves, and attempted to protect them from injury and murder, either at their 
master’s or another’s hands (Westermann 1955, p1713). If unfairly treated, a slave 
could gain ‘right of sanctuary’ in a temple and he could appeal for the authorities 
to allow him to be resold to another master (Bury 1964, p914). If a slave was 
living away from his master’s house, and was wronged, his master could go to 
court on his account.’15 Personally, I believe that although they are overshadowed 
by the existence of slavery itself, these few legal rights that slaves had in Attica 
do demonstrate a notion of human dignity, even though this notion had obviously 
a very narrow scope. This is because the interpretation of human dignity largely 
varied from the one today. Another piece of evidence, this time outside the 
Hellenic world, is the Cyrus the Great Cylinder which is presumably the first 
charter of rights of nations in the world16. ‘There were three main premises in the 
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 The emphasis is mine. 
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 Westermann, William L. 1955, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity, The 
American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia.  
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 Bury, J. B. et al. (editors) 1964, The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 5: ‘Athens 478-401 BC.’, 
The Syndics of the Cambridge University Press, England. 
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 Cliff, Ursula. Dickson College 2009 ‘Slavery in ancient Greece’. 
http://cliojournal.wikispaces.com/Slavery+in+Ancient+Greece. 
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 Ghasemi, Shapour. ‘History of Iran: The Cyrus the Great Cylinder’. Iran Chamber Soceity. 
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/cyrus/cyrus_charter.php. 
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decrees of the Cyrus Cylinder: the political formulization of racial, linguistic, and 
religious equality, slaves and all deported peoples were to be allowed to return to 
home; and all destroyed temples were to be restored.’17 
 
However, whether human dignity in the ancient world was a notion of such a 
significance that can be argued as having been the meta-legal norm on which the 
international legal order of the time was based is indeed a highly controversial 
claim. Although the view advanced in this discussion sees human dignity as 
always having been the international Gurndnorm, the view can still be defended 
even if one maintains that the ancients did not have a notion of human dignity.  
 
It could be argued that the ancients did not have a notion of human dignity, and 
that the notion of human dignity relevant to modern international law did not 
come into existence until around the seventeenth century, around the same time as 
the modern state, and it was only then that the Grundnorm became relevant to 
modern international law. This is an entirely defensible position to hold. In the 
ancient world, there was international law in a substantial sense, e.g. laws of war 
between nations and city-states of one nation. However, modern states developed 
in the seventeenth century and international law in the modern ‘formalistic’ sense 
developed later than that. It was only after the seventeenth century that most of 
the modern day body of international law was formed. Therefore, it can be argued 
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that though ‘substantial’ international law prior to seventeenth century was non-
teleological, it was only after the seventeenth century that the Grundnorm became 
relevant to modern international law. 
 
7.3. Attack on the New Haven School 
 
Another objection consists in an attack on the New Haven School. It could be 
argued that sometimes the New Haven School falls into a contradiction. The 
contradiction is between the expectations based on authority, legitimacy and 
coercion on the one hand, which are the definition of law according to the New 
Haven School, and the concept of the world public order on the other hand, which 
is the teleology of this theory. This theory is teleological because it sees 
international law as having a telos, a purpose: the purpose of establishing a world 
public order based on human dignity. The world public order is the purpose that 
international law serves. Sometimes, these two – namely the expectations on the 
one hand and the world public order on the other hand- are at odds with each 
other. Consider the following examples. Two centuries ago, there were slavery 
laws in North America. These laws were positive law. They were laid down 
according to the appropriate procedures, followed by the people and applied by 
the courts. They were laws in every sense in which the term ‘law’ is used both in 
a Legal Positivist context and in everyday language by ordinary people 
(admittedly, natural law theorists like Thomas Aquinas would maintain that 
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though slavery laws were applied, they were not laws because they were immoral 
and unjust). They were laws just like any other law of that time. Also, there was 
the expectation that the courts would apply these laws. Everyone expected that 
people brought to the US as slaves would be treated as slaves, that, usually, if a 
slave escaped, he/she would be arrested, if caught, etc. Since these expectations 
were in place, then these laws were laws according to the definition of the New 
Haven School. However, they cannot have been laws according to the New Haven 
School, because they were contrary to human dignity. Thus, the definition of law 
and the teleology of the New Haven School are at odds with each other and the 
New Haven School falls into a contradiction: slavery laws were laws (definition 
of law) and they were not laws (teleology). Another example is the Nazi regime. 
The Nazi party was legally elected to power and the Nazi laws against the Jews, 
homosexuals and gypsies were positive law, since they were laid down according 
to the procedures described by law. In addition, it was expected that if any of 
these laws was violated, the courts would apply these laws. Therefore, these laws 
were laws according to the definition of the New Haven School. However, it is 
obvious that these laws were against a world public order based on human 
dignity. Notably, the problem is not entirely a problem of the past. In North 
Korea, draconian criminal laws impose capital punishment and confiscation of 
assets on anyone who listens to a foreign broadcast or writes ‘reactionary’ letters. 
It is expected that anyone who is arrested listening to foreign broadcasts or 
writing ‘reactionary’ letters will be convicted by a court of law and the 
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punishment provided by the law will be applied. Since these expectations exist, 
this is a valid law according to the definition of law of the New Haven School, 
whereas it is not law according to its ideology since these laws violate human 
dignity.  
 
An attempt on behalf of the New Haven School to address this problem would be 
to prioritize the teleology over the definition of law. In other words, the definition 
of law of the New Haven School could be postulated as being the expectations of 
people in authority as stated above, with the addition of the dependent clause 
stating the ideology as a necessary requirement. Thus, the definition of law 
according to the New Haven School could be that law is the expectation of 
politically relevant actors that are grounded in a belief in someone’s authority and 
the threat of coercion, unless these expectations are against a world public order 
based on human dignity. Admittedly, this would complicate things as a value 
judgment, namely whether a law is against a world public order based on human 
dignity, infiltrates the very definition of what is law. In practice, the judge could 
address this problem with the following reasoning. The judge engages in 
empirical-psychological reasoning and detects stable patterns of expectations. If 
these expectations can facilitate a world public order based on human dignity, 
then these expectations are interpreted as evidence of law. If it so happens that 
these expectations are clearly against a world public order based on human 
dignity, then these expectations will not play a primary role as evidence of 
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international law and the other sources of international law, mainly treaties and 
custom will be taken into consideration. This is not to be seen as ‘if the 
expectations are against world public order, then it is bad law so we do not regard 
these expectations as law at all’. This would be a natural law view in which the 
definition of ‘bad law’ would be law contrary to world public order. The New 
Haven School is not a Natural Law view. It is not the case that laws in accordance 
to world public order are ‘good’ laws and thus valid, whereas laws contrary to 
world public order are ‘bad’ laws and thus invalid. The world public order based 
on human dignity is not a criterion of validity of laws. The world public order 
based on human dignity is the purpose of law and thus the way with which 
international law ought to be interpreted in order to achieve this purpose. The 
point here is to look for evidence of law – treaties, custom, stable patterns of 
expectations - with the goal of creating a world public order. The interpretation of 
international law should be such that enables the international legal order to 
achieve this goal, this purpose, this telos. To the extent that stable patterns of 
expectation can be interpreted as facilitating a world public order based on human 
dignity, to that extent these stable patterns of expectations are evidence of 
international law.  
 
Although this is indeed a problem for the New Haven School, it may not 
necessarily be a problem for the suggestions advanced in this discussion. This 
discussion is grounded on Kelsen’s Legal Positivism. The definition of 
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international law according to Kelsen’s Legal Positivism modified in the light of 
the New Haven School as suggested in this discussion is that international law is 
international treaties, international custom and general principles of law, Article 
38 of the Statute of the ICJ (1 a-c), and judicial decisions and teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists (1d), which includes stable patterns of 
expectations, as subsidiary means for the determination of law (again, 1d). Since 
international treaties and international custom remain sources of international law 
in this new definition, the judge could more safely justify expectations that are 
obviously against world public order based on human dignity as violating 
international treaties or custom.  
 
7.4. Why can re-interpretation of a sub-Grundnorm not bring about a domestic 
regime change?  
 
The view holds that in domestic legal orders, regime change necessarily implies 
change of the sub-Grundnorm. On the contrary, in the case of the international 
legal order, regime change necessarily implies change of the interpretation of the 
one and only Grundnorm. Why not say that the sub-Grundnorm of a domestic 
legal order remains the same and the re-interpretation of it changes the regime? 
 
This is a very sensible objection. Indeed, it could be argued that a domestic legal 
order can perform a regime change by re-interpreting the sub-Grundnorm. 
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However, according to the theory, it is recognition by the international legal order 
which makes a domestic regime change valid. If a domestic regime change is 
valid even if it is not recognized by international law, as this objection implies, 
then international law cannot be regarded as superior to national law. 
 
Therefore, this objection necessarily leads to the well-known issue of whether 
international law is superior to national law. I personally agree with Kelsen that 
international law is superior to national law. Supporters of the primacy of 
international law over national law can thus accept the view of this discussion 
whereas supporters of the view that national law is superior to international law 
will agree with the objection. Although whether international law is superior to 
national law is not exactly the point of this discussion, I will present two 
arguments of Kelsen regarding the supremacy of international law over national 
law. Regardless, I understand that if one does not accept the supremacy of 
international law over national law, he/she cannot accept Kelsen’s theory on 
international law, neither this modified theory of Kelsen as presented in this 
discussion. 
 
The first argument is a reply to the argument often presented by voices arguing 
for supremacy of national law over international law. Their argument is as 
follows. If international law is superior to national law and international law 
creates states, then how can international law have come to exist since states 
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created international law? International law is mainly a set of rules that regulate 
relationships between states and international organizations. Therefore, states 
created international law and national law is superior to international law. This is 
what Kelsen calls the historic and the logico-juristic view18 which he rejects. This 
view starts from the premise that the custom by which international law is created 
consists in acts of states. Thus, there must have been states before there could be 
any international law. But how can national law derive its validity from 
international law if the rise of the latter presupposes the existence of the former?  
 
The fact that customary international law exists does not necessarily imply that 
the existence of states preceded the existence of international law. It would be 
quite possible that primitive social groups developed into states simultaneously 
with the development of international law. The fact that tribal law is, at least, not 
a later product of intertribal law allows such a conjecture. But even if the 
existence of states really preceded the existence of international law, the historical 
relation between national and international legal orders does not preclude the 
logical relation which, it is maintained, exists between their reasons of validity. 
As long as there was no international law, the reason of the validity of national 
law was not determined by international law. If international law does not exist, 
or is not presupposed to exist as a legal order obligating and authorizing the 
states, the principle of effectiveness is not a norm of positive law but only a 
                                                          
18
 Kelsen, Hans. 1952. Principles of International Law. New York; Rinehart & Company Inc. p. 
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hypothesis of juristic thinking. When, however, an international law arose – that 
is to say, when legal norms created by the cooperation of two or more states came 
into existence – and the principle of effectiveness became a part thereof, the 
national legal orders were brought into a relationship to international law in which 
international law is superior to national legal orders.                
 
Secondly, supporters of the primacy of national law over international law hold 
the well-known statement that international law is valid for a state only if it is 
‘recognized’ by the state19. Although this rule certainly sounds more democratic 
as it gives states the ability to choose what rules they have to obey, it sadly does 
not explain reality. As Kelsen replies, this rule is not a rule of positive 
international law. Positive international law does not make its validity for a state 
dependent upon recognition by this state. When a new state comes into existence, 
this state, according to international law, immediately receives all obligations 
imposed and all rights conferred upon a state by this legal order, independently of 
whether or not the state recognizes international law. According to international 
law itself, it is not necessary to prove that a state has consented to a norm of 
general international law in order to be able to assert that, in a specific case, in a 
concrete case, this state has violated an obligation, or another state has infringed 
upon the former’s right, stipulated by the norm in question. A norm of 
international law which makes its own validity for the state dependent upon its 
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recognition by the state is logically impossible because the validity of such a 
norm presupposes a validity of the international law independent of its 
recognition. Thus, an international legal norm A which is valid for a state X only 
if A is recognized by X is logically impossible because the validity of A 
presupposes a validity of international law independent of its recognition. For A 
to exist, there must already be international law that created it. 
 
In any case, it is clear that the validity of the theory in this discussion is 
contingent upon the primacy of international law over national law.  
 
7.5. Is this ‘theory’ a modification of Kelsen’s Legal Positivism, or a different 
theory? 
 
The view advanced in this discussion makes two radical departures from Kelsen’s 
Legal Positivism, with the two suggestions discussed above. This inevitably raises 
two similar questions. Firstly, is this view really just a modification of Kelsen’s 
Legal Positivism, or are the departures from Kelsen’s view so radical that this 
view is really a totally different positivist view? Secondly, is this view really a 
Legal Positivist view at all? 
 
I will firstly address the second question. Although the view advanced in this 
discussion is characterized by two important departures from Kelsen’s Legal 
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Positivism, it is still a Legal Positivist view, because it maintains the main 
proposition of Legal Positivism. There are several theories of law, which may 
agree on certain points but also disagree in many others, but they are all Legal 
Positivist views. What makes these theories Legal Positivist theories, and not 
Natural Law theories of law for example, is the fact that they accept the main 
proposition of Legal Positivism.  
 
The main proposition of Legal Positivism is stated by John Gardner: ‘In any legal 
system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of 
the law of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits (where its merits, in 
the relevant sense, include the merits of its sources)’20. This proposition must not 
be confused with Kelsen’s Legal Positivism which is a complete theory of law. 
The main proposition of Legal Positivism has barely any content and it only 
makes a rather mild claim. This is merely a proposition about the conditions of 
validity of certain norms21. Thus, it answers not the lege ferenda question, i.e. 
how law should be, but on the contrary it merely answers the lege lata question, 
i.e. what the law actually is. If one wants to know what the law in a specific legal 
order is, the answer would be that law is the norms that are legally valid.  
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The main proposition of Legal Positivism states the criterion of legal validity but 
it does not make any further claims besides that. The heart of Legal Positivism is 
that the legal validity of a norm depends on its sources and does not depend on its 
merits, e.g. whether it is just or unjust, a good policy or bad policy. Sources are 
not determined by this main proposition of Legal Positivism. Thus, according to 
positivism, there can be valid law in a dictatorship in which the dictator is the 
only one authorized to lay down law, because the legal validity of a norm depends 
on its sources, and the source here is the dictator’s command. Also, as John 
Gardner explains, the main proposition of Legal Positivism does not entail certain 
commitments that many people think it does. It does not entail that judges are 
under the professional obligation not to refuse to decide any case that is brought 
before them and that lies within their jurisdiction; and it does not entail that 
judges are under the professional obligation to decide cases only by applying 
valid legal norms to them22. This is not to say that according to Gardner judges 
are under no professional obligation to decide cases only by applying valid legal 
norms. This is to say that the professional obligation judges have to decide cases 
only by applying valid legal rules to them, assuming this is so in all legal orders, 
is a characteristic of contemporary legal orders but not a necessary entailment of 
the main proposition of Legal Positivism. 
 
What makes a view a Legal Positivist view is the acceptance of the main 
proposition of Legal Positivism. Both Kelsen’s theory and the view advanced in 
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this discussion accept the main proposition of Legal Positivism as stated by John 
Gardner, so they both fall under the umbrella of Legal Positivism. The view 
advanced in this discussion is a modification of Kelsen’s theory and it adopts the 
hierarchy of law of Kelsen’s theory as the criterion of validity: whether a given 
norm is legally valid depends on its sources, not its merits and the source is that 
the rule in question is in accordance with higher legal norms and has been laid 
down by the proper procedures. Thus, generally speaking, rules of jus cogens are 
superior to other international customary rules, international customary rules are 
superior to clauses of international treaties, etc. Furthermore, one could still ask 
how the validity of a sub-Grundorm is explained in terms of its sources, rather 
than its merits. The answer is that the validity of a sub-Grundnorm is explained, 
just like in Kelsen’s theory, in terms of its sources: the sub-Grundnorm and its 
national legal order is valid because it is recognized as valid by the source of 
recognition of the national legal orders, namely the international legal order. The 
sub-Grundnorm is valid because it is in accordance with the higher legal norms, 
namely the international legal order. The recognition of the sub-Grundnorm on 
behalf of the international legal order takes place according to the process that has 
been laid down by international law. This process is the principle of effectiveness. 
According to the principle of effectiveness, if a national legal order is, by and 
large, effective, then it is valid according to international law. ‘Effective’ is not a 
value judgment; it is not a ‘merit’ of a rule or of an order. International legal order 
recognizes a sub-Grundnorm as valid not based on its merits, e.g. not based on 
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whether it is good or bad, moral or immoral, democratic or non-democratic, but 
based on the principle of effectiveness, which is not a value judgment as good and 
bad, moral and immoral etc. are. The view advanced here maintains Kelsen’s 
monism and primacy of international law over national law, so the international 
legal order that recognizes the sub-Grundnorm is superior to the sub-Grundnorm. 
This is in accordance with Kelsen’s hierarchy of law: national law derives its 
validity from international law. Indeed, it seems that primacy of international law 
over national law is interconnected with hierarchy of law. The issue of the 
superiority of international law over national law and the fact that both Kelsen’s 
theory and the theory advanced in this discussion are contingent on accepting the 
primacy of international law over national law have been addressed in the 
previous objection. It is expected that supporters of the idea that national law is 
superior to international law will obviously reject both Kelsen’s theory and the 
theory advanced in this discussion. I have now explained that both Kelsen’s 
theory and the view advanced in this discussion accept the main proposition of 
Legal Positivism and therefore both theories fall under the umbrella of Legal 
Positivist views. This answers the second question, i.e. whether the view 
advanced in this discussion is a Legal Positivist view.  
 
However, the first question still remains unanswered, since many Legal Positivist 
views, although they all accept the main proposition sated above, still radically 
disagree with each other, and the one cannot be called a modification of the other. 
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For example, HLA Hart’s theory of law is a Legal Positivist theory, but it differs 
from Kelsen’s theory in many important points. (Hart maintains that international 
law is ‘law’ but not a ‘legal system’. He arrives at this conclusion on the basis of a 
comparison of the international legal order with the municipal legal system. Thus, 
by following Hart’s theory of law, one cannot talk about a positivist theory of 
international law that can account for regime change). In any case, Kelsen not 
only provides a complete theory of legitimacy, explains how law operates, how it 
changes and develops and how it is enforced, but also his theory is the most 
influential and the most developed theory of Legal Positivism in the international 
realm.  
 
I will now address the first question, i.e. whether this view is really just a 
modification of Kelsen’s Legal Positivism, or if the departures from Kelsen’s 
view are so radical that this view is really a totally different Legal Positivist view. 
This view is not a totally different Legal Positivist view. It is indeed a 
modification of Kelsen’s Legal Positivism because the most important component 
of Kelsen’s Legal Positivism remains a necessary component of this view: the 
Grundnorm. Important changes have been made here. At the very beginning of 
this discussion, I stated that according to Kelsen, since regime change means the 
substitution of one legal order by another, in the case of regime change, the 
Grundnorm of the previous legal order somehow disappears and respectively the 
Grundnorm of the new legal order appears. In the view advanced in this 
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discussion, this happens with the sub-Grundnorms but not with the international 
Grundnorm which always remains the same, ‘idle’, and in the case of which only 
the interpretation changes. This is a significant difference, but the view is still 
based on the Grundnorm and thus it is still based on Kelsen’s theory. This view is 
a modification of Kelsen’s theory of international law. 
 
7.6. International regime change or international regime modification? 
 
The view advanced in this discussion is based on Kelsen’s theory, according to 
which the constitution is the highest law and the foundation of a legal order and 
the constitution is based on the Grundnorm. When it comes to domestic legal 
orders, change of the sub-Grundnorm and of the constitution means regime 
change. On the contrary, change of the interpretation of the constitution, means no 
regime change. That could be characterized as regime modification. However, 
according to the view advanced in this discussion, when it comes to the 
international legal order, the Grundnorm does not change and international regime 
change does not consist of change of the Grundnorm but it consists of change of 
the interpretation of the Grundnorm. Why is this change of interpretation an 
international regime change and not an international regime modification? A 
relevant question that needs to be addressed simultaneously is the following: what 
set of facts constitute regime change? 
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In order to reply to this objection, it is necessary to draw a line between regime 
change and regime modification. As stated at the beginning, regime change is the 
substitution of one legal order by another. A legal order is based on its 
constitution. Thus the substitution of a constitution of a legal order with another 
constitution is a substitution of a legal order by another, which means regime 
change. As explained above, according to Kelsen and according to the view 
advanced in this discussion, in domestic legal orders, this would entail 
substitution of one sub-Grundnorm by another. On the contrary, a change of 
interpretation of the constitution of a domestic legal order does not amount to 
regime change. Borrowing the terminology of the objection, that could be called 
regime modification. Therefore, to put it simply, in domestic legal orders, change 
of constitution means regime change whereas change of the interpretation of the 
constitution means regime modification. The same happens in the international 
legal order. A change of the constitution of the international legal order amounts 
to regime change, whereas change of the interpretation of the constitution 
amounts to international regime modification. At the current state of international 
law, I take the constitution of the international legal order to be the UN Charter. 
Therefore, a substitution of the UN Charter by another ‘constitution’ of the 
international legal order would be a regime change, whereas a change in the 
interpretation of the UN Charter would be an international regime modification. 
Indeed, there are differences between the international legal order and the 
domestic legal orders when it comes to regime change. In domestic legal orders, 
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change of constitution would necessarily entail change of the sub-Grundnorm. On 
the contrary, in the international legal order, change of the UN Charter with 
another constitution of the international legal order would not bring about a 
change of the Grundnorm of the international legal order. Also, in the domestic 
legal orders, the sub-Grundnorm is not subject to different interpretations; only 
the constitutions can be interpreted in different ways. On the contrary, in the 
international legal order, not only the constitution, but also the Grundnorm can be 
subject to different interpretations, and, as stated above, it is the change in 
interpretation of the international Grundnorm that accounts for regime change. 
 
7.7 Is reliance on Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute necessary? 
 
If Article 38 (1) of the Statute is used in the discussion solely in order to bring in 
the New Haven School’s psychological sources, namely the stable patterns of 
expectations, then the use of the Article 38 (1) is unnecessary because whether 
state political and legal elites rely on these psychological sources in their own 
decision making should be the way to introduce the psychological sources. If by 
definition, legal elites do rely on these sources, there is no need to argue further 
and the use of Article 38 (1) is unnecessary to say the least. 
 
The response has to do with the nature of the theory. I will not object to legal 
elites, as a matter of fact (not as a matter of law), relying on psychological sources 
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in their decision making. If this factual, ontological premise was not accepted by 
the view advanced in this discussion, the view would not use these psychological 
sources as one of the two suggestions with which Kelsen’s view is hereby 
modified. The view advanced in this discussion accepts that legal elites rely on 
these psychological sources as a matter of fact, not as a matter of law. This means 
that this view accepts that legal elites in reality might indeed rely on stable 
patterns of expectations in their decision making, but they cannot use these 
psychological sources as justifications in their decisions. Indeed, decisions are 
currently mostly justified on legal clauses, custom, previous decisions and legal 
principles, not on stable patterns of expectations. How could it be the case that 
judges can use these psychological sources as justifications in their decisions? 
Legal Realism, i.e. the school of thought that sees law as behavior, international 
relations approaches to law or policy oriented perspective on international law as 
the New Haven School could use these psychological sources as source of law 
because of the mere fact that these psychological sources are actually used by 
legal elites. However, this is not the case with Legal Positivism based on Kelsen. 
Only if these psychological sources are regarded as a source of positive law, 
alongside with treaties, custom and principles of law, can the Legal Positivist 
view advanced in this discussion treat these psychological sources as a source of 
law. As it has already been discussed, the view advanced in this discussion is, just 
like Kelsen’s view, a Legal Positivist view, not a view grounded on the New 
Haven School or Legal Realism.  
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The objection could continue by placing a different argument within a positive 
law perspective. First, judges are not the only (or even primary) authoritative 
makers and interpreters of international law.  States themselves are the primary 
makers and interpreters.  Other actors, too, such as international organizations and 
treaty bodies (such as the UN Human Rights Committee or North Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization), can make and interpret international law.  Second, judges 
are not bound by Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute unless they happen to sit on the 
ICJ.  The ICJ is only one of dozens of international, regional, and national 
tribunals that is an authoritative interpreter of international law, and its 
jurisprudence is a small fraction of all those judicial decisions.  Third, the ICJ 
itself regularly resorts to sources not listed in Article 38 (e.g., resolutions of the 
UN General Assembly).  Therefore, Article 38 is not really relevant here even 
from a positive law perspective. 
 
There is no doubt that these observations are entirely true. Admittedly, this view 
relies on approaching some major key components of the international order with 
a slightly different view than they have in real, in the current international realm. 
For example, the view advanced in this discussion sees the UN Charter more or 
less as the constitution of the international legal order. This is how this view 
suggests that we see the UN Charter. However, this is not exactly how the entire 
international community always sees the UN Charter, especially when political 
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interests come into play, which is often the case. Similarly, regarding the 
objection at issue, this view sees the Article 38 (1) of the Statute as having a 
somewhat greater role in the international legal order than what it really does. The 
view advanced in this discussion sees this Article as an expression of the sources 
of international law that not only the ICJ but also other international tribunals use 
in their decision making. According to Kelsen, the two sources of international 
law are treaties and custom. If it is asked how positive law shows that these are 
indeed the two main sources of international law, the answer advanced by this 
discussion is that positive international law states so in Article 38 of the Statute. 
Similarly, alongside with treaties, custom and general principles of law, this view, 
being a Legal Positivist view, needs to include the psychological sources in a 
positive legal clause in order to be able to present it as a source of law in Legal 
Positivism. 
 
7.8. Principle of effectiveness and hierarchy of law  
 
What if a judicial decision conflicts with the statute the decision supposedly 
enforces, and the decision is implemented by the parties?  On a hierarchical 
positive law theory, the decision is illegal. The view advanced in this discussion, 
based on Kelsen's positions, holds that that a judge would be breaking the law by 
departing from a higher norm of positive law.  However, on a principle of 
effectiveness, the decision embodies the law. Since it cannot be both, then it 
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seems that the principle of effectiveness and hierarchy of law cannot be 
reconciled. 
 
This objection seems very sensible and coherent, but it rests on a misconception 
of the principle of effectiveness. The issue here is not ‘a’ principle of 
effectiveness but ‘the’ principle of effectiveness. This is a principle of positive 
international law which has a specific meaning and this is how it is used both by 
Kelsen and the view advanced in this discussion. Thus, the principle of 
effectiveness is a principle of positive international law and it does not aim to see 
if a specific law or a specific decision is valid, but only if the national legal order 
in its entirety is valid, according to the international legal order. Also, Kelsen does 
not hold that a legal order is valid if every single law and/or every single decision 
is always valid or in accordance to a higher norm etc. On the contrary, he states 
that according to the principle of effectiveness, the legal order need not be entirely 
effective, but 'by and large effective'. The key point though is that the principle of 
effectiveness refers to a legal order in its entirety, not to a specific decision or 
law. 
 
However, the objector could insist by arguing the following. Kelsen specifically 
states that a judicial decision or ‘lower’ law contra legem can nonetheless be valid 
law.  For example, Kelsen states that: ‘Those who accept the hypothesis of the 
primacy of international law, however, are just as mistaken when they maintain 
73 
 
that international law overrides national law, that a norm of national law is null if 
it is not in conformity with international law. This would be the case only if there 
existed a positive norm providing a means of annulling a norm of national law 
because of its nonconformity with international law. General international law, at 
any rate, does not contain any such norm.’23 His demand for a ‘means of 
annulling’ a lower law indicates that he believes, absent an enforcement 
mechanism, that higher laws necessarily allow themselves to be overridden by 
lower laws.  If the hierarchy of norms breaks down when a lower norm is more 
‘effective’ (enforceable) than a higher norm, what we have is an expression of the 
principle of effectiveness. 
 
Again, a lower norm becoming enforceable is not an application of the principle 
of effectiveness, which refers, as stated above, to the international legal order 
granting validity to a national legal order which by and large effective. However, 
even leaving the principle of effectiveness per se aside, the objection does seem to 
demonstrate a problem: how can the international legal system be regarded as 
hierarchical when a lower norm can violate a higher norm and still become 
enforceable? 
 
This could, however, be answered, though the answer is more likely to satisfy 
merely legal positivists. In this case, lower norm violated the higher norm and the 
                                                          
23
 Kelsen, Hans. 1952. Principles of International Law. New York; Rinehart & Company Inc. p. 
446. 
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lower norm was implemented by the parties. The latter ought not to have 
happened. Indeed positive international law often lacks the means to annul such a 
decision and states themselves are expected to do so. If the court that issued the 
decision is a court of the domestic legal order, then the respective state in 
violation of international law. As Kelsen states ‘Illegality of a norm means 
possibility of abrogating the norm or inflicting a sanction upon the norm-creating 
organ. The framing of a norm violating a higher norm may be a delict to which 
the legal order attaches a sanction. … The delict is not in contradiction to law; it 
is not a negation of law; it is a condition determined by law.’24 Thus, in such a 
case, the state, through its judiciary, is in violation of international law, even 
though the parties implemented the decision.  
 
However, what if the court is an international tribunal? In such a case, an 
international court issues a decision, which violates a higher international legal 
norm. The answer here could be something similar to the one in a national legal 
order. If a court decides a case in a way which is against a higher norm, let us say 
the constitution, and the decision is implemented by the parties, no one would 
seriously argue that the lower norm of the courts is higher than the constitution. It 
is generally accepted that the constitution is the highest law of a national legal 
order. The hierarchy of law remains intact, even though the lower norm which 
was implemented violated the higher norm. A decision is ‘unconstitutional’ 
                                                          
24
 Kelsen, Hans. 1952. Principles of International Law. New York; Rinehart & Company Inc. p. 
423. 
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means nothing more than that if a competent court decides that the decision is 
unconstitutional, the competent court can annul the decision, even if it was 
implemented by the parties. (Of course in such cases the legal order protects the 
parties who relied on the decision, but that is an entirely separate issue.) Similarly, 
in international law, in the rare exception where an international tribunal decides a 
case in clear violation with the statute the decision supposedly enforces, then if a 
competent international court decides that the aforementioned decision was in 
violation of the relevant statute, the competent court can annul the decision. Just 
like in national legal orders, unconstitutional laws and decisions are valid and 
enforceable until (and if) a competent court decides that the law or decision in 
question is unconstitutional, in the international legal order, a decision of an 
international tribunal is valid and enforceable, until (and if) a competent court 
decides that the decision is in violation with the statute. Just like in national legal 
orders hierarchy of law is not overridden by the fact that occasionally 
unconstitutional laws and decisions are valid, the same is so in the international 
legal order. Notably, the quote advanced by the objection regarding international 
law not having means to annul a decision, refers to positive international law not 
having the means to annul a decision of a national court - although international 
law can sanction states for violating international law - not to international law 
being unable to annul a decision of an international court.  
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSION 
This discussion addressed four problems with Kelsen’s account on regime change 
and advanced two solutions in the light of the New Haven School, to try to 
address these problems. This is obviously neither a new theory of law nor a 
complete theory of regime change. This is merely an attempt to advance the 
discussion regarding Kelsen’s Legal Positivism account on regime change 
forward. I hope it has been made clear that Kelsen’s account has problems and 
thus his theory needs to be somehow modified in order to account for regime 
change. This discussion has provided some suggestions on which concrete 
solutions can be built upon.  
 
This is in line with the general concern that the international community has been 
trying to address over the last decades, namely ensuring that national orders do 
not grossly violate fundamental rights of their citizens. Traditionally, actors of 
international law were only states and international organizations, not individuals. 
Domestic issues of a state were not a concern of international law. This led to 
inability of international law to act when states were suppressing their own 
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citizens. The so called principle of humanitarian intervention, a controversial 
customary rule of international law, has a limited scope: it permits a state to 
violate the state sovereignty of another state, if the latter state is suppressing the 
citizens of the former state that happen to be in the latter state. Even if there is 
such an international customary norm, it does not permit the intervention of a 
state to protect citizens of the target state. Therefore, international law at its 
current state does not have the tools to efficiently protect citizens from their own 
states. External regime changes to protect citizens from their own states, even if 
when they are regarded as moral, are also seen as illegal, at least from those who 
want to be consistent with positive international law. 
 
A reformed conception of international law can perhaps help the international 
community to justify intervention and regime change in order to protect citizens 
from their own states. Individuals have gained much ground in the international 
realm and international law now starts to consider individuals as subjects of 
international law to a certain extent. Regime change, internal or external, must 
establish a legal order which protects citizens at least from gross violations of 
certain fundamental rights. This discussion has tried to make a small contribution 
towards that direction. 
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